Commentary: Musk, Myanmar and the murky future of internet freedom
Governments that once saw internet connectivity as an economic or social tool now recognise it can be compromised by geopolitical power plays, says this academic.
Without access to an independent and reliable internet service, Myanmar's resistance groups would face even greater suppression. (Photo: AP)
SINGAPORE: For anti-government groups engaged in resistance movements, securing reliable communication channels is often a matter of life and death. In many cases, the very states they are fighting against control the mainstream internet infrastructure, leaving such groups vulnerable to surveillance, shutdowns and censorship.
As a result, opposition groups increasingly rely on foreign-owned networks, such as satellite internet services, to bypass government control and maintain connectivity. While these alternatives provide critical access, they also expose them to new vulnerabilities, as access can be revoked or manipulated by external actors.
In Myanmar, revolutionary groups and civil society organisations (CSOs) rely on Starlink, Elon Musk’s satellite internet service. This highlights the dangers of such dependence, particularly as the world braces for potential policy shifts under the new United States administration.
For Myanmar’s resistance groups and ordinary citizens, Starlink has provided a critical lifeline amid military-imposed internet blackouts. According to Access Now, a digital rights group, over 500 internet shutdowns in the country were documented worldwide in 2023, with Myanmar among the most affected.
ATHAN, a Myanmar non-profit organisation, reported that all 330 townships in Myanmar have experienced some form of communications blackout – whether telephone or internet outages – at least once since the coup.
Starlink’s availability has enabled a broad spectrum of anti-junta forces as well as local communities to bypass government-imposed restrictions, share evidence of human rights violations, and coordinate efforts against the junta.
Forces resisting the junta, for example, have established satellite-based access to the internet in more than 60 areas under their control. Without access to an independent and reliable internet service, these groups would face even greater suppression, leaving millions in an information vacuum controlled by state propaganda.
SIGNIFICANT RISKS
However, this dependency exposes them to significant risks. The junta has sought ways to track and intercept satellite communications, potentially endangering those who rely on the service for safe and anonymous online activities.
Reports indicate that the State Administration Council (SAC) has escalated its surveillance capabilities, targeting encrypted messaging, virtual private networks and other alternative communications used by opposition groups. Civilians who rely on these networks for accessing independent news sources or communicating with the outside world could find themselves targeted simply for staying informed and connected.
Further complicating matters is the fact that Starlink is owned and controlled by Elon Musk, whose personal decision-making has triggered unpredictability in global affairs.
Musk’s control of the network raises concerns about whether access could be revoked, restricted, or manipulated based on shifting political or economic interests. Given his close ties to US President Donald Trump, concerns are mounting about the use of Starlink in Ukraine, which is critical for the country’s war with Russia.
In February, there was a heated exchange between US President Donald Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelenskyy over the terms of a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire agreement. According to a Reuters report, US negotiators pressured Ukraine to get access to the country’s critical minerals by threatening to cut off the country’s connection to the satellite service (Musk said the report was false).
In Cameroon, Musk disconnected Starlink access in April last year. A government regulator said the company was operating without a licence and posed a threat to the country’s security. In South Africa, Musk has reportedly refused to meet a 30 per cent local ownership requirement.
For Myanmar, the country’s scam industry, which is responsible for large-scale online fraud operations, has drawn scrutiny from international law enforcement. However, digital activists from Myanmar have often expressed concerns that in the cracking down of scam centres – some of which use Starlink – pro-democracy forces may also lose access.
If Musk (or Trump) imposes broad restrictions on Starlink due to concerns about online scamming and illicit businesses, it could have unintended consequences – severing critical communication channels for activists and resistance groups while doing little to curb criminal enterprises, which often operate with state complicity and access to alternative digital infrastructures.
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK DEPENDENCY
To be clear, the global implications of network dependency extend beyond Myanmar. Countries dependent on foreign-owned digital infrastructure – from undersea cables to cloud services – face similar vulnerabilities. Governments that once saw connectivity as a purely economic or social tool now recognise it can be compromised by geopolitical power plays.
The US has already demonstrated its willingness to use key technologies as leverage, as seen in the restrictions and tariffs imposed on the semiconductor industry. Should the same strategy be applied to satellite internet services, dependent populations could be left in limbo.
To mitigate these risks, countries and resistance movements must diversify their digital infrastructure and invest in alternative technologies. For resistance groups, creative thinking and a deeper understanding of communicative modalities are necessary.
They should consider their target audience and the type of information they aim to convey before selecting a means of communication. Not all forms of communication require internet access – it should not even be the default approach in conflict-prone or vulnerable areas.
Localised mesh networks, which allow devices to communicate without centralised internet providers, offer a potential solution. This technology enables computers and devices to connect directly without passing through any central authority.
For example, The Serval Project was launched after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti to create a disaster-proof wireless network that enables cellular-like communications in the absence of cellular signals. Similarly, the Open Mesh Project seeks to provide open and free communications to citizens facing digital repression from their governments.
Ultimately, connectivity is power; and power concentrated in the hands of a few is a liability for many. As Myanmar’s resistance groups and ordinary citizens navigate their digital futures, they should recognise the perils of placing their communication lifelines in foreign hands – especially in an age where politics can dictate who stays connected and who is left in the dark.
The international community, in turn, should recognise the stakes of allowing a small number of private actors to control critical digital infrastructure in conflict zones. Failure to do so will not only impact Myanmar but set a troubling precedent for internet freedom and digital sovereignty worldwide.
Surachanee Sriyai is Visiting Fellow with the Media, Technology and Society Programme at ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute’s blog, Fulcrum.
