Commentary: Did India PM Modi get what he went to Washington for?
There is significant anxiety in India that United States President Donald Trump ultimately believes in the possibility of negotiating a bilateral deal with China, says Sinderpal Singh of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

President Donald Trump shakes hands with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the Oval Office of the White House, on Feb 13, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Alex Brandon)
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SINGAPORE: As countries try to navigate relations with a United States under new leadership, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has come up with a familiar slogan: “Make India Great Again”.
He coined this phrase when meeting US President Donald Trump in the White House in February. The visit has been largely seen as a success in India, considering public debate around Mr Modi not being invited to Mr Trump’s inauguration and the US deporting illegal Indian migrants in shackles just days before the visit.
Mr Modi’s key strategy was to build on the close personal relationship between the two leaders that developed in Mr Trump’s first term, in order to reaffirm - early in Mr Trump’s second term - India’s position as a key partner.
The chemistry between the two was clear, but did Mr Modi get what he went to Washington for?
WILL INDIA DODGE THE TARIFF BULLET?
While India has not been caught up in targeted tariffs like Canada, Mexico and China, it does not look like it will dodge the reciprocal tariff bullet.
“Whatever India charges, we’re charging them,” Mr Trump said at the press conference with Mr Modi for this recent visit.
India’s trade surplus with the US, its largest trade partner, has nearly doubled since Mr Trump’s first term and will likely widen further given India’s strong manufacturing and services sectors.
Mr Trump also previously criticised India as a “tariff king” and a “very big abuser of trade”. Before Mr Modi travelled to the US, the Indian government had pre-emptively cut tariffs on certain goods that impacted US imports, such as high-end motorcycles and cars.
During this visit, both leaders agreed to negotiate a trade deal that aims to more than double bilateral trade to US$500 billion by 2020. It is not yet clear if this will be a formal free trade agreement, which would require issues like market access in India for US imports to be resolved. The Trump administration has highlighted that India’s tightly protected and subsidised agricultural sector keeps out US agricultural goods.
India has also made broad commitments to increase energy imports as well as to purchase US weaponry.
Mr Modi also made the case for the continued mobility of Indian professionals, even as he agreed to take back Indian nationals living illegally in the US. This mobility is crucial for Mr Modi’s domestic priorities, given the sluggish Indian economy and slow job growth especially for graduates.
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT US-CHINA DEALINGS
Mr Modi also sought to position India favourably in the US’ shifting approach to global affairs - and he may see more success there.
First, India has strongly supported Mr Trump’s desire to end the war between Ukraine and Russia. Since the February 2022 invasion, India has attempted to fend off pressure from the US and Europe for not openly condemning Russian actions and for keeping diplomatic channels open with Russia in continuance of their deep historical relationship.
More crucially, Indian leaders fear Russian isolation, borne out of the Ukraine conflict, will drive it deeper into China’s geopolitical orbit.

Second, India will not be dramatically affected by Mr Trump’s drive to get US allies to take on more responsibility - especially financial - for global issues. In fact, it gives India space to demonstrate its readiness to share in the burden, and to work more closely with US allies such as France, Japan and Australia seeking to balance US downsizing of its commitments.
Third, India sees Mr Trump’s appointment of China hawks to key roles in his administration as a positive sign. A more forceful US policy towards China could possibly temper the latter’s actions across the India-China border.
But there is a significant degree of uncertainty and anxiety in India that Mr Trump ultimately believes in the possibility of negotiating a bilateral deal with China.
This feeds perennial fears about a “G2” compact to the detriment of Indian interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. The future of this administration’s China policy will be closely watched.
AN ASIAN MODEL OF DEALING WITH DONALD TRUMP
Asia states will watch, with interest, India’s approach to managing the challenges posed by a second Trump administration.
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) could be one area where India could possibly be asked to do more in the security domain, as a key initiative to counter China.
While Southeast Asia had been lukewarm to this four-power platform (which also includes US, Australia and Japan), a reinvigorated Quad could be seen as a positive development, contributing to a stable balance of power within East Asia. Southeast Asia could possibly expect a more visible role for India in the region, with the possibility of the joint India-Russia supersonic BrahMos missile finding buyers beyond the Philippines, especially since the US has signalled the need for countries to do more for their own security.
In making deals, downplaying differences and turning on the charm, India could offer an interesting Asian model of how to deal with the Trump administration.
Dr Sinderpal Singh is Assistant Director and Coordinator of the South Asia Programme and Regional Security Architecture Programme, at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University.