Boots on the ground: China in a spot as North Korea marches into Russia’s war on Ukraine

SINGAPORE: Artillery rounds. Anti-tank missiles. And now, soldiers.

Troops have become North Korea’s latest contribution in support of Russia’s war in Ukraine - which has intensified over the weekend - putting China in an uncomfortable “diplomatic tight spot”.

China has many reasons to be concerned, analysts say.

It is worried that the escalation risks pulling Asia into the European conflict, raising the stakes and bringing unwelcome conflict closer to its doorstep. 

It is facing pressure from the United States and South Korea to use its sway - however much there is - to rein in North Korea and Russia. 

It is coming at a time when the world’s second-largest economy wants regional stability while working to boost its flagging economy.

At the same time, some experts also say Beijing may not view such a development as “all bad”.

China is cognisant of the strategic benefits - a strategic loss for the West in the scenario of a Ukraine defeat “could be significantly advantageous for China” against the backdrop of Sino-West tensions.

NORTH KOREAN BOOTS ON THE GROUND

According to South Korean and US defence intelligence, more than 10,000 North Korean soldiers have arrived in Russia since the end of last month. Seoul warned last week that a substantial number are already deployed at the frontline.

This includes the western Kursk region, where Ukraine is three months into a cross-border offensive. Kyiv has confirmed engaging with North Korean forces, and that the fighting resulted in losses.

Analysts believe China is unhappy over North Korea entering the conflict.

“China has largely maintained a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine crisis (since it began), opposing NATO expansion and Western involvement in the region while consistently calling for peace and dialogue,” said Ms Aparna Divya, a PhD candidate in international politics at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University.

“(North Korea’s troop deployment) contradicts Beijing’s longstanding principle on this conflict.”

Observers say Beijing also sees Pyongyang’s move as potentially raising the stakes of a hot war and prolonging a grinding battle that has already exacted a hefty toll on global food and energy security. It is the first time a third country has placed boots on the ground in the conflict.

China is particularly concerned the conflict could be brought closer to home, Dr Edward Howell, departmental lecturer in international relations at Christ Church, University of Oxford, told CNA.

South Korea has already signalled it could get involved. President Yoon Suk Yeol now says the country is not ruling out providing weapons directly to Ukraine - in what would be a departure from its longstanding policy of not providing arms to countries in conflict.

South Korea is technically still at war with its northern neighbour. Analysts have said Seoul is worried about North Korean troops gaining valuable combat experience and military know-how from Russia, as well as possible reciprocal support from Moscow to support Pyongyang’s nuclear arms ambitions.

“Depending on the level of North Korean involvement, we will gradually adjust our support strategy in phases,” Mr Yoon said on Nov 7.

There could be grave consequences if Seoul does follow through, warned Dr Alexey Muraviev, an associate professor of national security and strategic studies at Curtin University.

“We may end up having a … proxy conflict, where Ukraine is considered a proxy conflict between the two Koreas and allies,” he told CNA.

CHINA’S DIPLOMATIC DILEMMA

The developments have thrown into sharp relief the deepening ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, which analysts say are making the Chinese uneasy.

A paper published on Nov 1 by researchers from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War suggests that Pyongyang may be using its growing alignment with Moscow to reduce its dependence on Beijing.

The report asserts that China has been using its influence to restrain North Korea’s aggression. As such, reduced Chinese leverage on Pyongyang is likely to destabilise the Korean Peninsula and pose a greater risk to the broader Asia-Pacific region.

Since the 1950s, Beijing has been Pyongyang’s most vital ally, providing trade, diplomatic support and military aid to the Kim regime. They share a mutual defence pact - China’s sole such accord with any country.

This was also the case for North Korea, up until June when it inked a security treaty with Russia that obligates both sides to provide military assistance “without delay” if either nation faces an armed attack. Pyongyang and Moscow have both ratified the accord.

North Korea’s deployment of troops to Russia “weakens the narrative that China is a force for peace, in contrast to the US”, wrote Chinese foreign policy observer Reid Standish in a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article published on Oct 30.

Mr Standish noted that the move undermines Beijing’s position that Western countries should stay out of Asian defence matters, now that “the Indo-Pacific is inserting itself into Europe’s security conversation”.

Analysts say this places China in a diplomatically challenging position.

On the one hand, the Russia-North Korea arrangement risks a bloc being formed. Inevitably including China, it would be placed against a US-South Korea-Japan alliance, said Mr Zhu Feng, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University, in a Nov 6 report by British news outlet The Guardian.

“The problem is that kind of Cold War mentality is completely against the Chinese national interest. Today’s China is not the 1950s China,” he added.

On the other hand, Beijing stands to gain from a Russia-North Korea alliance as this would “certainly” put additional pressure on South Korea, Japan and the US, explained Dr Muraviev from Curtin University.

He believes the arrangement could also help stabilise the unpredictability of the North Korean regime.

“Why am I saying this? Because Kim Jong Un would not be able to do something adventurous or dangerously risky right now without having formal approval from the Kremlin,” he said.

“Putin right now doesn't want to have … another war on his Eastern doorstep … I think that's what the Chinese would also be feeling quite comfortable about.”

Whether it feels otherwise or not, Beijing has publicly said growing Russia-North Korea ties are their own business. 

"North Korea and Russia are two independent sovereign states. How they develop bilateral relations is their own matter,"  said a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson on Nov 1.

CHINA STILL IN DRIVER’S SEAT: ANALYSTS

Some observers have suggested that warming ties between Russia and North Korea could leave China out in the cold, weakening its influence.

However, analysts CNA spoke to disagree with this assessment. They think China is and will remain in the driver’s seat.

Dr Muraviev suggested that China may be tacitly offering "quiet approval," or at the very least, choosing not to "vehemently oppose" the expanding military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.

“Beijing would not want to see developments (among its neighbours) that could undermine its strategic position,” he said, while noting that the North Korean regime would also likely avoid actions that contradict China’s interests, given the “deeply embedded” economic ties between the two nations.

“I cannot see North Korea and Russia pursuing a path that excludes Beijing,” said Dr Muraviev, citing China’s “significant influence” over both nations.

Likewise, Ms Divya of Fudan University believes Moscow and Pyongyang will continue to put their relations with Beijing ahead of their own.

“China would still have the power to stop North Korea and Russia's progress if it (chooses to do so),” she added.

Still, the extent of Chinese leverage is considerably uneven between the two countries, analysts note.

For North Korea, China holds a major sway primarily due to their economic relationship. Beijing is by far Pyongyang’s biggest trade partner, accounting for more than 90 per cent of North Korea’s total imports and exports.

Late last month, three senior American diplomats met with China’s ambassador in the US to voice Washington’s concerns over North Korea’s troop deployment and urge Beijing to use its influence to curtail Pyongyang’s cooperation with Moscow.

It’s a different case for Russia. 

Dr Muraviev said while China may not be in a position to dictate Moscow’s actions, the longstanding respectful and cordial relationship between Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Mr Putin allows for “consultation on major decisions” that impact both countries.

What’s unclear is what action, if any, China intends to take as North Korean soldiers deploy on foreign soil, fighting alongside Russian troops against Ukraine.

While China is worried about the impact on regional stability, Dr Muraviev said that Beijing does not want to see Russia lose the war.

"Ukraine's defeat would represent a strategic loss for the West, which could be significantly advantageous for China. It would enable China’s continued strategic rise amid the ongoing US-China competition," he explained.

Dr Muraviev further pointed out that the war also serves as a case study from which China can extract valuable lessons, particularly concerning the Taiwan issue.

China considers the self-ruled island an inalienable part of its territory and has said it will never commit to renouncing the use of force in reunification.

“China could use this to (understand) what it takes to win in a major conventional war, should (Beijing) choose to use force to resolve the Taiwan issue. They are learning from Russia's mistakes as well as successes,” Dr Muraviev said.

"After all, China also has its own interests in the game."

TRUMP 2.0 SPARKS UNCERTAINTY

Observers have noted that the re-election of Mr Donald Trump as the next US president introduces fresh uncertainty over the trajectory of the Russia-Ukraine war, which will enter its third year in February.

The US under the Biden administration has been the biggest military backer of Ukraine, committing around US$59 billion in security assistance to Kyiv since the Russian invasion.

This could be thrown into question under Trump 2.0.

Mr Trump has been critical about the scale of American support to Ukraine. He said repeatedly during his presidential campaign that the fighting should stop, and that he could end the war “in a day” through a settlement - though without specifying exactly what peace would look like.

The expectation of Mr Trump pushing to end the war has led to intensified fighting, as both sides try to make whatever gains they can ahead of any potential negotiations, suggested Dr Stefan Wolff, professor of international security at the University of Birmingham, in a CNA commentary on Nov 7. 

“This would mean another strong push by Russia in eastern Ukraine, increasing attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and potentially more North Korean soldiers involved in the fighting in Russia’s Kursk region,” he added.

At the same time, Dr Howell from Oxford University anticipates that Mr Trump will be concerned about the strategic alignment between China, Russia, and North Korea, and will likely take steps to "fracture" their potential alliance, whether on the military or economic front.

But the businessman-turned-politician’s transactional approach to foreign relations could also pose challenges for allies Japan and South Korea, noted Dr Muraviev. 

During his first term, Mr Trump wanted them to pay billions of dollars more to cover the cost of the local US military presence. Analysts have said Mr Trump will likely keep up this approach in a second term.

Analysts suggest China could exploit these shifts to create a new geopolitical dynamic in the region, even beyond North Korea’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war.

“Even if the war in Ukraine ends … the relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang will continue,” said Dr Howell.